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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Boyce argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record 
with various transcripts. Mr. Boyce argues that the requested transcripts are 
necessary for his appeal because the district court can utilize its own memory form the 
prior proceedings when it decided to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. Additionally, 
Mr. Boyce argued that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation. 
In response, the State argues that the requested transcripts cannot be added to 
the appellate record because they did not exist prior to the probation violation 
disposition hearing and, therefore, the district court did not consider them when it 
revoked Mr. Boyce's probation. The State then uses aggravating information from the 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) when addressing Mr. Boyce's 
argument that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. 
This brief is necessary to address the State's characterization of the requested 
transcripts as new evidence. Mr. Boyce argues that requested transcripts are not new 
evidence because the district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings 
when it considers whether to revoke probation. Mr. Boyce also argues that the State 
should be judicially estopped from arguing that the transcripts are irrelevant to the 
probation issue while simultaneously arguing that aggravating information contained in 
the PSI supports the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Boyce's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts have a broad range of discretion to consider information 
when making sentencing decisions. In light of that broad range of sentencing 
discretion, Idaho appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide 
complete records on appeal. In instances where a complete record has not been 
provided, appellate courts presume that the missing transcripts or exhibits support the 
trial court's determinations on appeal. In some instances, appeals have been dismissed 
due to the appellant's failure to provide transcripts of hearings which occurred years 
before the disposition of the issue on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Boyce argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection when he requested various transcripts 1 necessary to 
provide an adequate record for appeal. In response, the State argues that the 
requested transcripts are not necessary because the district court did not have those 
transcripts when it made the determination to revoke his probation. The State goes as 
far as arguing that the requested transcripts would constitute new information on 
appeal, which cannot be considered by an appellate court. The State's position is not 
1 The State accurately points out that Mr. Boyce references an Admit/Deny hearing held 
on April 19, 2010, and a disposition hearing held on August 2, 2010, in the Appellant's 
Brief, about those hearings never occurred. (Respondent's Brief, p.4 n.1.) Accordingly, 
Mr. Boyce withdraws all assertions of error regarding the foregoing hearings. 
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supported by case law, and if taken to its logical conclusion actually limits a district 
court's sentencing discretion to consider information from prior hearings because a 
transcript of a prior hearing would have to be created before a district court could 
consider information from that hearing. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested 
Transcripts 
Indigent defendants can require the State to pay for an appellate record including 
verbatim transcripts of the relevant trial proceedings. However, the State does not have 
to provide indigent defendants with anything they request. In order to meet the 
constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the State must provide 
indigent defendants with an appellate record. In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
denied Mr. Boyce's requests for transcripts of his original change of plea hearing, 
sentencing hearing, and rider review hearing. That denial prevents Mr. Boyce from 
adequately supporting the issues raised on appeal. Idaho case law requires appellant's 
to provide a complete appellate record in order for an appellate court to rule on the 
merits of the issues on appeal. 
In response to this position, the State argued that the requested transcripts "of 
hearings held approximately eight years before the decision at issue" cannot be 
considered on appeal because the "as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented 
to the district court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, they were never 
part of the record before the district court in considering whether to revoke [Mr. Boyce's] 
probation and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.6-7.) Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the 
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district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding 
whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a 
sentencing or probation decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that 
information offered at sentencing or a probation disposition hearing. Rather, a court is 
entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and observations. 
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 
Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are 
based, in part, upon what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 
318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of 
criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district 
and the quantity of drugs therein involved."); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 
1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could 
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). 
Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court 
may rely upon the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings 
when it made the decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. 
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable and inconsistent with case law 
because all transcripts, except a transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, 
would be deemed new information. For example, the transcript of the November 10, 
2011, evidentiary hearing would be considered new information and irrelevant to the 
district court's order revoking probation because it was prepared after the January 11, 
2012, probation disposition hearing. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. 
6 
Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (2000), where the district court examined the defendant 
about his guilty plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett 
failed to provide a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed 
that something occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing 
decision. Id. In light of the foregoing authority, the transcript of the December 19, 2002, 
sentencing hearing is necessary because the district court questioned Mr. Boyce. 
(R., p.35.) 
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then a transcript of a 
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an 
appeal is filed from an I.C.R. 35 motion. Further, if that is new information, a district 
court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at sentencing when 
evaluating an I.C.R. 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 452-453 
(Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of an appeal 
from the denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide the PSI 
and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See also State v. 
Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984 ). In light of the foregoing authority, the transcript 
of the December 19, 2002, sentencing hearing is necessary for review in this case 
because the district court questioned Mr. Boyce during that hearing. (R., p.35.) 
The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20 
(Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 
and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the 
district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of 
retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation 
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was then revoked. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was 
excessive. Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. 
The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the 
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must 
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where 
Warren bit off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the 
merits of his sentencing claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original 
PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original 
sentencing was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's 
claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that the district court referenced the 
original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that 
the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the 
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Boyce failed to request the various transcripts, 
the State could have argued that his appeal should have been dismissed for failure to 
provide an adequate appellate record. 
The State also asserts that Mr. Boyce "with no citation whatsoever, that to 'meet 
the constitutional of due process and equal protection,' the state must provide him (and 
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the state 
proves 'that some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous."' 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.7).) Mr. Boyce's burden shifting 
argument was based on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 ), where the 
United State Supreme Court first held that the State does not need to "waste its funds 
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by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review." However, the Court 
went on to hold that: 
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim 
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an 
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his 
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make 
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State 
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice 
for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our 
statement in Draper, 2 that: 
'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative 
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and 
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The 
trial judge would have complied with * * * the constitutional mandate 
* * * in limitin~ the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing 
by the State.' 
Id. (footnote omitted). If it is apparent on the record that there is a colorable need for 
the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts 
are irrelevant. Therefore, l\/lr. Boyce's burden shifting position is supported by the case 
law referenced by the State. 
In sum, Idaho provides its courts with a very broad range of discretion to consider 
information when making sentencing decisions. Due to that broad range of discretion, 
2 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963). 
3 While addressing on the State's argument the Court also noted that: 
[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the 
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition 
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would 
be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the 
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available 
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the 
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, 
irrelevant. 
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an appellant must provide an extensive appellate record in order to challenge a 
sentencing or probation revocation determination on appeal because Idaho appellate 
courts will presume any missing information will support the district court's decision. In 
light of this, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Boyce due process and equal 
protection when it denied Mr. Boyce the transcripts of hearings he will need to 
overcome this presumption. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation 
A Introduction 
The State objected to Mr. Boyce's requests for the transcripts of various hearings 
based on a theory that they are irrelevant to the district court's ultimate decision to 
revoke probation. The State prevailed with its objection. In its Respondent's Brief the 
State argues that the aggravating evidence contained in the PSI is relevant to 
Mr. Boyce's probation argument. The State's positions are contradictory and the State 
has gained a procedural advantage in this appeal based on these contradictory 
positions. Therefore, the State should be judicially estopped from utilizing this 
advantage. Specifically, Mr. Boyce requests that, if this court determines that items not 
offered as evidence at the probation disposition hearing are not relevant this Court 
disregard the aggravating evidence contained in the PSI. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation 
"The application of judicial estoppel is one of discretion." Sword v. Sweet, 
140 Idaho 242, 252 (2004). "Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine 
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of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage by 
taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible 
position .... " McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152 (1997) (quoting Rissetto v. 
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996). 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general 
considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the 
dignity of judicial proceedings .... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect 
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts .... Because it is 
intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable 
doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion." 
Id. (quoting Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601). 
In t~1is case, the State objected to Mr. Boyce's request for transcripts of various 
hearings. (Objection to Motion to Augment, pp.2-4.) In support of that objection, the 
State argued that Mr. Boyce failed to demonstrate that the transcripts played any role in 
the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. (Objection to Motion to 
Augment, pp.4.) The State continued to advocate for this position in, Section I, of the 
Respondent's Brief, when it argued that Mr. Boyce has failed to explain how "transcripts 
of hearings held approximately eight years before the decision at issue in this case are 
necessary to decide" the issues currently on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-13.) In 
Section 11 of the Respondent's Brief, the State then argued as follows: 
The district court's determination that alternatives to incarceration were 
not feasible is also supported by other information known to the court at 
the time it revoked [Mr. Boyce's] probation, including [Mr. Boyce's] criminal 
history and his performance on probation. [IVlr. Boyce's] conviction in this 
case marked his second conviction for grand theft and his third conviction 
for theft offense, generally. (PSI, pp.2-3.) [IVlr. Boyce] committed his first 
grand theft when he stole almost $9,000 from the Jack-In-The-Box where 
he worked as a shift leader. (PSI, pp.90-91.) In Connection with his 
sentencing in that case, [Mr. Boyce] assured the court that "it will never 
happen again." (PSI, pp.91.) He was given a withheld judgment and was 
placed on probation, which he subsequently violated by failing to pay 
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restitution, failing to maintain employment, failing to report to his 
supervising officer and failing obtain permission from his supervising 
officer before leaving his assigned district. (PSI. pp. 2, 4, 56.) The district 
court reinstated him on probation and ordered him to serve 90 days in jail. 
(PSI, pp.2, 4.) Less than one year later, while he was still on probation for 
his first grand theft conviction, [Mr. Boyce] committed the offense in this 
case by stealing approximately $2,700 from the Burger King where he was 
employed. (PSI, pp.2, 9, 17, 22-23, 33.) 
(Respondent's Brief, p.20.) All of the citations from the preceding quotation are from the 
original PSI. Therefore, the State used the PSI to its benefit in Section II of the 
Respondent's Brief. 
In light of the foregoing, the State has received an unfair procedural advantage in 
this matter because denial of the transcripts of the sentencing hearing and the rider 
review hearing prevent Mr. Boyce from addressing any corrections made to the PSI and 
the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) at the 
respective hearings. Notably, the court minutes of the June 10, 2003 rider review 
hearing, indicate that Mr. Boyce spoke with the district court and, more importantly, 
corrections to the APSI were made during that hearing. (R., pp.43-44.) Moreover, there 
is no way of knowing if there were corrections made to the PSI at the sentencing 
hearing.4 In fact, this creates a unique procedural due process violation. In criminal 
4 The minutes of the sentencing hearing do not expressly indicate that corrections to the 
PSI were made. (R., pp.34-35.) However, this is not dispositive of whether corrections 
to the PSI were made at the sentencing hearing because there is no requirement that 
sentencing courts redline portions of a PSI they deem unreliable. See State v. Carey 
274 P.3d 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals does consider it better practice 
for district courts to redline information they deem unreliable to prevent a defendant 
from being prejudiced by that information in a subsequent proceeding. State v. 
Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, the district court might 
have made corrections to the PSI, but there is no way of knowing without the transcripts 
of the sentencing hearing. 
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prosecutions, one-sided procedural laws, that benefit only the government, violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 
(1973). Mr. Boyce asserts that, under a logical extension of the reasoning set forth in 
Wardius, there is no legitimate reason why one-sided procedural rulings that benefit 
only the government in an appeal should be treated any differently. 
In Wardius, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute that required 
a criminal defendant to provide written notice of an alibi defense, including the names 
and contact information of witnesses, prior to trial, but "made no provision for reciprocal 
discovery [from the government]." Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72. The Court noted that 
the Due Process Clause "speak[s] to the balance of forces between the accused and 
his accuser." Id. at 474. As a result, the Court noted that it "has therefore been 
particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the 
State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a fair 
trial." Id. at 474 n. 6. The Court held, "It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant 
to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the 
hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he 
disclosed to the State." Id. at 475-76. 
With the principles set forth in Wardius in mind, Mr. Boyce asserts that the 
decision to deny Mr. Boyce access to the transcripts of the sentencing and rider review 
hearings creates a one-sided procedural advantage for the State. The PSI is a 
permanent record which, after it is created, is sent to the Idaho Department of 
Correction and can be used against Mr. Boyce at a later time in the same proceedings 
or in subsequent proceedings. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 
13 
1998). Idaho Criminal Rule 32 (g)(1) guarantees a criminal defendant access to the PSI 
and an opportunity to challenge any adverse matters in the report and an opportunity to 
present favorable evidence during the sentencing hearing. However, Mr. Boyce's only 
opportunity to correct the PSI was at his 2002 sentencing hearing. State v. Person, 145 
Idaho 293, 296-297 (Ct. App. 2007). Likewise, Mr. Boyce's only opportunity to correct 
the APSI was at the 2003 rider review hearing. 5 Here, the State has access to the 
aggravating evidence contained in the PSI, but Mr. Boyce has been denied access to 
the transcripts which he could use to establish that the district court made corrections to 
that material. In other words, the State has a one sided procedural advantage because 
it has access to aggravating evidence, but Mr. Boyce has been denied access to the 
materials he could use to challenge that evidence. The need for these transcripts is 
amplified because the district court reviewed the PSI and the APSI at the December 8, 
2010, probation violation disposition hearing. (08/12/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-18.)6 
In sum, the State has gained a procedural advantage by objecting to the 
inclusion of the requested transcripts, which precludes him and appellate counsel from 
identifying any potential corrections made to the PSI, and then arguing the substance of 
the PSI as an aggravating factor as part of it probation argument. Due to the State's 
5 Mr. Boyce recognizes that he does not have a due process right to make corrections 
to the APSI. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264-265 (Ct. App. 2003). However, 
Goodlett is inapplicable because the district court did make corrections to the APSI. 
After making the corrections to the APSI, the court altered the record and its 
considerations when it placed him on probation. 
6 As a final note, Mr. Boyce's inability to use the transcripts of the sentencing hearing 
and the rider review hearing to identify the corrections made to the PSI and the APSI 
support his due process argument contained in Section I of this brief. Accordingly, the 
arguments made in this section of the Appellant's Reply Brief are incorporated into 
Section I. 
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contradictory positions and the procedural advantage it attempts to gain, this Court 
should be disregard the substance of the PSI in aggravation in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Boyce 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district 
court to place Mr. Boyce on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of May, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
THOMAS EDWARD BOYCE 
INMATE #55850 
SICI 
PO BOX 8509 
BOISE ID 83707 
MICHAEL R MCLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
ALAN E TRIMMING 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
SFW/eas 
16 
